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KNOWING WHEN NOT TO FIGHT
David Luban*
[forthcoming, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE ETHICS OF WAR, ed. Helen Frowe & Seth
Lazar]
Draft

On the eve of battle, Shakespeare’s Henry V, disguised as a common soldier, talks
with his men.
King: Methinks I could not die anywhere so contented as in the King’s company,
his cause being just and his quarrel honorable.
Michael Williams: That’s more than we know.
John Bates: Ay, or more than we should seek after; for we know enough if we
know we are the King’s subjects. If his cause be wrong, our obedience to
the King wipes the crime of it out of us.1
Henry thinks his soldiers’ clear consciences depend on the justice of his cause. If so,
Bates and Williams should refuse to follow him into battle if his cause is unjust. Bates
disagrees, and tethers his clean conscience solely to his duty of obedience.
Theirs is a debate about selective conscientious objection by soldiers.2 Bates
argues against it; Henry implicitly, and probably without meaning to, licenses it. But the
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University Professor in Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University. I am grateful to the editors of this
volume for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this chapter.
1
Henry V, act 4, sc. 1
2
This is a different issue from selective conscientious objection by civilians. The soldier has made a
commitment that the civilian has not. Even the conscript has not refused to enter the ranks of the military,
and in states where the penalty for conscientious objection is not dire, this is a genuine choice. Because of
this commitment, a soldier’s decision to refuse orders to deploy is harder than the civilian’s decision to
refuse to join the military.
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dialogue raises an epistemic issue as well. Williams insists that the justice of Henry’s
cause is more than a common soldier knows. That sounds right, especially when we read
the comically arcane legalisms and dubious histories Henry’s advisors produce in Act 1
to convince him of his rightful title to French territory. What can Henry’s soldiers be
expected to know of the Salic law of succession or the genealogy of eighth-century
French kings?
Bates adds a moral twist to Williams’s epistemic doubts. Not only is the just
cause “more than we know,” it is “more than we should seek after.” Williams’s position
and Bates’s are importantly different. Williams is describing the epistemic plight of the
common soldier. Bates offers prescription, not description. Not only are common soldiers
not in a position to know whether their cause is just, they should not try to put themselves
in a better position. Bates’s reason: “we know enough if we know we are the King’s
subjects.” Apparently deference to the King’s political authority is supposed to imply
deference to his epistemic authority as well.
Bates actually makes two distinct claims. One is that obedience to the king “wipes
the crime out of us.” Even if the soldiers knew the king’s cause was unjust, they should
still fight, because the king’s authority provides an exclusionary reason to obey. Call this
the absolute deference claim. The other is that soldiers should not independently
investigate the jus ad bellum – for that is the natural reading of “more than we should
seek after.” Call this the no-inquiry claim. In what follows, I explore these claims, first
Throughout, I use the word “soldiers” to refer generically to members of the active military forces
of the contesting parties – recognizing that that includes sailors, fliers, and in some cases cyberwarriors and
purveyors of other exotic technologies. I am generally speaking of “tip of the spear” war fighters, that is,
those whose job directly includes committing acts of violence. Many of the same conclusions will apply to
those in support roles, although the arguments must then be filtered through whatever moral principles
apply to indirect participation in acts of violence.
For a thoroughgoing debate about the morality of selective conscientious objection, readers should
consult the 2002 symposium issue on the subject in the Israel Law Review.
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that of Williams and then the more problematic claims of Bates. To preview the
conclusions: Williams is right; Bates’s absolute deference claim is not. But I will defend
a weaker version of Bates’s prescription: not absolute deference to the King’s authority,
but strong presumptive deference that can be overridden only in cases where the war is
manifestly unjust. This is a version of the no-inquiry claim: a manifestly unjust cause is
one that wears injustice on its face, so that no inquiry is required.
This position about the obligations of common soldiers – not to fight in
manifestly unjust wars, but not to delve into the justice of wars whose injustice is not
manifest – is far from novel. It is the unanimous view of the early modern just war
theorists Cajetan, Suárez, and Vitoria. But my argument for the no-inquiry claim will
differ from theirs. I focus on the moral importance of civilian control of the military – a
value I believe contemporary just war theorists wrongly neglect, just as I fear they
underrate the inherent epistemic problems soldiers confront in judging jus ad bellum.
Williams’s epistemic claim
Michael Williams’s claim is that ordinary soldiers are in no epistemic position to
judge whether the king’s cause is just. Like his philosopher namesake 600 years later,
Williams is no radical skeptic.3 Nothing in principle makes knowledge of just cause
inaccessible to the common soldier. The problem lies in contingent and context-specific
challenges arising from the fog of war, including the political fog of going to war.4
Philosophers perhaps underestimate the epistemic difficulty of judgments about just
cause. Even when the purported just cause is self-defense, it isn’t always self-evident
3

Michael Williams, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Skepticism (Princeton
University Press, 1995); The Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology (Oxford
University Press, 2001).
4
On the need for particularized rather than blanket challenges to knowledge claims, see Williams, The
Problems of Knowledge, pp. 150-51.
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who attacked whom. Lyndon Johnson used the make-believe second Gulf of Tonkin
incident to get Congress to authorize the Vietnam War; the truth took years to emerge.
Even World War II, the standard example of a war of clear-cut right and wrong, began
with a false flag operation, “Operation Himmler,” in which German troops in Polish
uniforms “attacked” German border towns, shooting (to miss) at the locals. They
vandalized buildings, broadcast Polish nationalist slogans from a radio station they
seized, and left behind the murdered bodies of political prisoners dressed in Polish army
uniforms, which were displayed to journalists as proof of a Polish incursion into German
territory. The next day, Hitler announced his invasion of Poland. “This night for the first
time Polish regular soldiers fired on our territory. Since 5.45 A.M. we have been
returning the fire, and from now on bombs will be met by bombs.”5 The world’s worst
war of aggression was off and running under color of self-defense.
Shakespeare well understood that politicians launch wars for deceptive reasons
and ulterior motives. He depicts King Henry as an honest and honorable sovereign, but
Henry’s advisors are clerical schemers. The play opens with them plotting war to distract
Parliament from a bill to confiscate church property. That sheds a harsher light on the
legalistic argle-bargle they serve up to the King about his territorial rights in France.6 To
be sure, political mendacity, and the difficulty for outsiders to know what happened on
the ground, are contingent obstacles to right judgment of just cause, not in-principle
5

Address by Adolf Hitler, September 1, 1939, at
http://www.fcit.usf.edu/HOLOCAUST/resource/document/HITLER1.htm (accessed May 8, 2015). On
Operation Himmler, see Martin Allen, Himmler’s Secret War: The Covert Peace Negotiations of Heinrich
Himmler (Carroll & Graf, 2005), p. 51; M. R. D. Foot, “Conditions Making for Success and Failure of
Denial and Deception: Democratic Regimes,” in Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz, eds., Strategic Denial
and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge (Transaction Books, 2002), p. 100. On the Tonkin
Gulf incidents, see Pat Paterson, “The Truth About Tonkin,” Naval History Magazine 22 (2008), at
http://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/2008-02/truth-about-tonkin (accessed May 8, 2015).
6
I gratefully borrow the phrase from U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. United States v. Windsor,
570 U.S. ___ (2013), 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013)(Scalia J. dissenting).
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challenges. But they belong to the background description of the world in which just war
theory has a point; so even ideal theory must not abstract from them. They are so wired
into the world that we should regard them as (in the terminology of Valentini and Lazar),
parametric.7
Philosophers sometimes write as though just war theory is an ideal theory of
justification that should develop its principles without taking frictional forces into
account. Such a theory will provide criteria for moral scorekeeping undertaken by an
ideal observer. On this view of the nature of just war theory, the fact that common
soldiers are epistemically poorly positioned to use a principle is said to provide an excuse
for their objectively wrongful actions (maybe); indeed, it may provide a blanket excuse
for all agents similarly situated – which might be nearly everyone. But an excuse is not a
justification, and we have no reason to backpedal from the search for justificatory
principles of jus ad bellum, even if soldiers cannot apply them in real-world deliberation.8
This line of argument, in my opinion, places more weight on the distinction
between justifications and excuses than it can bear. I agree with Judith Lichtenberg that
appeals to excuses make sense where it is reasonable to expect most people to act
in a certain way, but where unusual conditions sometimes prevail or where a
particular individual falls short of the general requirements. … But if the
conditions that relieve people of responsibility are pervasive, if practically
everyone falls short, thinking in terms of excuses makes little sense.9
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Seth Lazar and Laura Valentini, “Proxy Battles in the Ethics of War” (2014) manuscript, p. 11.
Jeff McMahan articulates this view in “The Ethics of Killing in War,” Ethics 114 (2004): 701.
9
Judith Lichtenberg, Distant Strangers: Ethics, Psychology, and Global Poverty (Cambridge University
Press, 2014), pp. 116-17. Lichtenberg criticizes McMahan on similar grounds in “How to Judge Soldiers
Whose Cause is Unjust,” in David Rodin and Henry Shue, eds., Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and
Legal Status of Soldiers (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 122-24.
8
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The language game of excuses is played against a background of typical
conditions, where excusing conditions are exceptional. For the common soldier deciding
whether to follow the King into battle, the fog of war and politics are not exceptional
conditions. Neither are bounded rationality, time constraints on decisionmaking, and
limited access to information. These epistemic limitations parametrically define common
soldiers’ situation and constrain them to moral principles usable within the scope of those
limitations.10
The JAB court proposal
Jeff McMahan, among the most prominent recent defenders of selective
conscientious objection by soldiers, recognizes the epistemic difficulty facing ordinary
soldiers judging jus ad bellum (JAB) and offers an institutional solution: an international
court (or commission, or tribunal) that will provide impartial and authoritative findings
on whether armed conflicts satisfy the JAB criteria.11 Its purpose is to provide guidance
to the war fighters – guidance that can assist their moral deliberations about whether to
fight or to take the momentous step of becoming selective conscientious objectors to
unjust war.12 This would alleviate Williams’s epistemic doubts.
The prominence and relevance of McMahan’s proposal make it worth considering
in detail. For reasons I now explain, the JAB court proposal is unworkable. These reasons
concern its legitimacy, its fact-finding capacity, and its problematic relationship with

10

For further reflections on the idea of usable moral principles, see Gabriella Blum and David Luban,
“Unsatisfying Wars: Degrees of Risk and the Jus ex Bello,” Ethics 125 (2015), pp. 770-71.
11
Jeff McMahan, “The Prevention of Unjust Wars,” in Yitzhak Benbaji and Naomi Sussmann, eds.,
Reading Walzer (Routledge, 2014), pp. 229-55; the proposal for the JAB court is on pp. 241-52. McMahan
defends selective conscientious objection in “The Moral Responsibility of Volunteer Soldiers,” Boston
Review, Nov. 6, 2013, http://www.bostonreview.net/forum/jeff-mcmahan-moral-responsibility-volunteersoldiers.
12
McMahan, pp. 240-41.
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existing international institutions and international law.13
Legitimacy
1. Who sits on the JAB court, and who selects its members? McMahan favors an
unofficial court, for the excellent reason that an official court would become captive of
the states that establish it.14 Then the question arises how an unofficial, non-statesanctioned court could win the credibility and heft to do what McMahan wants it to do:
provide at least some authoritative basis for a fantastically weighty moral decision by
soldiers—a basis that soldiers can feel comfortable relying on if they refuse to deploy.
The JAB court cannot afford to be perceived as a politicized organization.
Recognizing this, McMahan proposes
international lawyers, scholars of international law, including representatives of
various national organizations, such as the American Society of International
Law, and veteran prosecutors, defenders, and judges from the criminal tribunals
for Rwanda and Yugoslavia. This list could also include just war theorists, moral
philosophers, political theorists, retired military officials, particularly former
Judge Advocate Generals and their counterparts in other countries, and perhaps
even some serving military personnel with training in law or ethics who might be
seconded to the congress in an advisory capacity.15
The JAB court would include judges from every region of the world – a crucial structural
feature adopted by all international tribunals.16
The problem is that the higher the stakes in any international body’s decisions—
13

I note at the outset of this discussion that McMahan acknowledges most of these problems, which he
believes can be solved. For the reasons that follow, I remain unpersuaded.
14
McMahan, pp. 246-47.
15
Ibid., p. 246.
16
McMahan agrees: ibid., pp. 247-48.
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and the JAB court has very high stakes, namely the decision by soldiers to disobey their
own governments—the greater the political pressures brought to bear on it, and the harder
it is to maintain impartiality, either in appointing court members or in their decisions.
This problem appears at two levels: not only in selecting the panelists, but also in
selecting the selectors.
Suppose, for example, that the Russian Academy of Sciences proposes a
candidate for an open slot on the JAB court, and Amnesty International proposes a
candidate, and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Australian
Philosophical Association, and the OAS each propose candidates. Suppose, realistically,
that all the candidates have impeccable credentials, but also have strongly opposed points
of view that their critics think are ideological. Amnesty lodges strong objections against
the Russian Academy’s candidate, a nationalist professor and Putin crony; the Arab
League objects to Amnesty’s candidate, a secular feminist; and the Chinese government
finds unacceptable the human rights expert who holds a chair at Oxford and defends the
universality of human rights. Nobody outside the U.S. and UK likes the American legal
expert who argues that nothing the United States does can possibly violate customary
international law, because if the United States does it, its prohibition can’t be custom.
Unfortunately, the soldiers who are the court’s intended audience will discover in
their first minutes on the Internet that reputable bodies have denounced some nominees
as ideologues and complained that others were excluded for ideological reasons. Rather
than alleviating their doubts, the JAB court will replicate them. In soldiers’ minds, it will
lack legitimacy, and that is because so many interested parties contest its legitimacy.
The difficulty is compounded in the case of hot-button issues, like Israel’s wars.

9
Fifty-three African countries have formally pledged “to eliminate zionism,” and antizionism is presumably a constant across the left-right spectrum throughout these
countries, as it is in the Arab world.17 How likely is it going to be that African
representatives on a JAB court will agree that any of Israel’s wars is ever just? But how
credible would a panel be that excluded African voices? The difficulties, it seems to me,
are intractable.
2. Philosophical disagreement all the way down. The problem is not only a matter
of cultural, regional, and political diversity and conflict. Suppose we stipulate a single
culture and subculture: Anglophone academic just war theorists. Is there any likelihood
that a JAB court is going to agree on criteria of just war, after they invite McMahan,
Gabriella Blum, Cecile Fabre, Adil Haque, James Turner Johnson, Asa Kasher, George
Lucas, David Rodin, Michael Walzer, and the editors of this volume to develop the
criteria? The fact is that today significant philosophical dissensus exists on criteria of just
cause.
3. Competition with existing international organizations. The JAB court is
supposed to be a trustworthy epistemic resource for troubled soldiers facing the issue of
conscientious disobedience. However, there are already two official world bodies
authorized to make determinations of aggression: the UN Security Council and the ICC.18
Suppose neither of them is willing to declare that a conflict includes acts of aggression. In
fact, suppose the Security Council—determined to head off or even undermine the JAB
court—declares there has been no aggression. How is a soldier supposed to conclude that
the JAB court got it right while the Security Council and the ICC are wrong? Unless the
17

The undertaking appears in the preamble to the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
– the fundamental African human rights treaty.
18
Article 39 of the U.N. Charter; article 5(1)(d) of the Rome Statute of the ICC.
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JAB court can somehow displace the UNSC and ICC from the epistemic field, it will
have a hard time establishing its own credibility.
All the points so far are challenges to the likelihood of establishing a JAB court
that has legitimacy, yet is also able to reach consensus on controversial conclusions in the
face of intense politicking around its membership and selection process. But suppose
these challenges can be overcome. Daunting problems still remain.
Fact investigation
4. The difficulty of fact investigation. JAB judgments are fact-intensive. Who sank
the boat? How intense is the violence? Did troops cross the border? Who fired first?
While McMahan by no means ignores the difficulty of a JAB court making factual
findings, he underestimates those difficulties.19 Fact-finding in conflict zones is
dangerous, expensive, frustrating, and unreliable. The international criminal tribunals
have a very hard time conducting fact investigations, because so many people on the
ground have an interest in concealing facts, including by silencing witnesses.20 Not only
witnesses and their families are threatened: investigator protection is an issue as well.
I mention these unhappy realities about international criminal investigations
because it seems clear that if it is hard to gather evidence post bellum, it will be even
harder in a hot war zone. How will the JAB court get investigators in while the bullets are

19

Ibid., pp. 250-51.
In 2014, the Prosecutor of the ICC announced that she was suspending the case against Kenya’s president
because of lack of evidence, resulting from non-cooperation of the Kenyan government and the decisions
of intimidated witnesses to withdraw their testimony, reportedly in the face of threats to them and their
families. “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the
withdrawal of charges against Mr. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta,” Dec. 5, 2014, http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/otp-statement-05-12-2014-2.aspx.
See also “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on the status of
the Government of Kenya’s cooperation with the Prosecution's investigations in the Kenyatta case,” Dec.
12, 2014, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/otp-stat04-12-2014.aspx.
20
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flying to figure out who started it and whose fault it was? For that matter, why would the
warring parties let them in? Perhaps the JAB court will rely on local investigators. They
too will have difficulty gaining access to conflict zones, and there is no reason to suppose
they will get to see anything the belligerents don’t want them to see.
A related problem is:
5. Intense disputation of facts, backed by claims of secret intelligence. Suppose
the JAB court must judge whether the United States has a preventive-war justification for
attacking a Middle Eastern adversary. The United States claims it has secret intelligence
showing the adversary has developed A-bombs and long-range missiles. It declines to
reveal the intelligence, on the ground of protecting sources and methods. How would a
JAB court evaluate those U.S. claims for factual accuracy? Would it develop its own
intelligence assets? Would it reveal their identities? McMahan responds that
few of us accept that our lack of access to classified information always, or even
usually, renders us incapable of justifiably believing that a war in progress is just
or unjust. … In general, however, the important question is not whether an ad
bellum court would be infallible, but whether its judgments could be reasonably
believed to be more reliable than those of any state or individual. And clearly,
they could be. … The court might still lack information possessed by a state that
refuses to divulge it, but in most cases the lack of such information would be
compensated for by the absence of self-interest that inevitably contaminates the
empirical and evaluative claims made by states.21
These arguments are unconvincing. No doubt contaminating self-interest is a fatal
epistemic disqualifier for many state assertions; but lack of information is an equally fatal
21

McMahan, “The Prevention of Unjust Wars,” p. 250.
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epistemic disqualifier – and honesty does not make up for ignorance.
Furthermore, the important question is not whether a JAB court would be
infallible (of course it won’t), or even whether its judgments are more reliable than those
of any state or individual. The important question is whether the JAB court’s judgments
are reliable enough to ground a soldier’s refusal to fight. That is partly the comparative
question McMahan poses: Is the JAB court more reliable than me? But it is also the noncomparative question “how reliable is the JAB court?”, because if soldiers think the court
is only slightly better positioned than they are, there is no reason for them to take the
court’s deliverances seriously. If the court cannot challenge secret intelligence, why
would soldiers believe the court?
6. Making judgments in real time. The JAB court is useless unless it can reach
verdicts in real time.22 Given the speed with which armed conflicts unfold, that is
scarcely possible. International fact-finders cannot act in days or weeks. Even if a war
lasts for a long time, its justice ad bellum may require continual re-assessment, so the
problem of making real time judgments in impossibly short intervals never goes away.
Meshing JAB judgments with law
7. Moral or legal judgments? Would the JAB court make moral judgments or
legal judgments or both? I take it McMahan wants the former: philosophers and others
are to develop moral criteria of JAB, based on the best moral theory, and not necessarily
consistent with international law.23 But how should those judgments sit in relation to
legal judgments? For better or worse, the JAB court would not operate in a normative
vacuum, and just as it would have to compete for legitimacy with the Security Council
22

Ibid., p. 249.
On the other hand, his proposed composition of the JAB court, quoted above at footnote 15, is heavily
weighted toward lawyers.
23
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and the ICC, philosophical criteria of just war would have to compete with existing
international law for normative authority.24
I am thinking especially of article 51 of the UN Charter, which declares that every
state has an “inherent right of self-defense.” As we know, the “inherent right of selfdefense” has proven more than a little controversial, not only among those philosophers
who reject it, but among lawyers and diplomats trying to interpret it. The ICJ has,
controversially, denied that states have an inherent right to defend themselves against
terrorist attacks by non-state actors.25 The United States, also controversially, expands the
inherent right of self-defense to include preventive war, as well as drone strikes against
terrorist groups in the territory of states unwilling or unable to control them.
Of course, one might think these controversies are exactly why we need a JAB
court to settle the dispute and enunciate the normatively best criteria of self-defense.
Unfortunately, the court would face a lose-lose dilemma: plunge into the morass of legal
arguments or ignore them. The former course would set it in competition with official
tribunals (like the ICJ and ICC), and would risk submerging morality to legalisms. But if
the JAB court ignores the law, why should soldiers accept its normative criteria when
their state is claiming “inherent right of self-defense,” which sounds pretty compelling?
Legal judgments become even more acute if the JAB criteria are broadened
beyond the Charter requirement of self-defense to include territorial grievances, such as
King Henry’s quarrel with France.26 So many conflicts arise from territorial disputes
24

I say this as someone who has defended a revisionist conception of just cause and criticized the UN
Charter’s article 2(4)-article 51 regime. Luban, “Just War and Human Rights,” Philosophy & Public Affairs
9 (1980): 160-81.
25
ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion of 9 July 2004, §§138-39.
26
As McMahan proposes in “Just Cause for War,” Ethics & International Affairs 19(3)(December 2005):
11-13. There he argues that just cause consists of any severe enough wrongdoing, including seizure of
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(think Kashmir, Crimea, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Turkey-Cyprus, Azerbaijan-Armenia, the
South China Sea) that it seems impossible for a JAB court to declare justice ad bellum
without addressing the territorial claims. And those are at least in part legal claims, often
quite fact-intensive, of the kind the ICJ spends years adjudicating.
8. Normative disagreement the resolution of which depends on unknown, possibly
unknowable, facts. If a JAB finding includes judgments about proportionality and
reasonable likelihood of success, the court would have to evaluate the probable
consequences of a war. But those depend on the military decisions and war plans of the
belligerents, which they are certainly not going to disclose (honestly) to a JAB court,
particularly an unofficial one that states don’t sanction.
Of course, an authoritative JAB court finding that there is no just cause could stop
there; lack of just cause by itself makes a war unjust. So the JAB court could limit its
mandate to evaluating just cause, and dodge the problem of predicting the unpredictable.
But if, as some theorists plausibly argue, the justice of a cause turns on proportionality
and necessity, even the just cause decision will be impossible for the court to tender.
For all these reasons, a JAB court will not be able to do the epistemic work that
soldiers confronting the question of conscientious objection urgently need. That means
they will have to deliberate on their own.
Once in a blue moon, the question of jus ad bellum will not be hard. A war of
naked aggression, unperfumed by propaganda, would present an easy case. Appian
reports that when Julius Caesar was debating with his captains about crossing the
Rubicon, he said, “If I don’t cross this river, I’m in trouble; if I do, everyone in the world

territory, that would make the perpetrator state liable to force in response. If an aggressor seizes territory
and the aggrieved state loses its war of self-defense, it has just cause to launch a war of recovery.
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is in trouble. Let’s go!”27 Here, at any rate, Caesar’s captains could recognize a
manifestly wrongful war in the making.
But easy cases are rare; even Hitler cloaked his aggression in the language of selfdefense. A more plausible case would be the situation of a soldier deployed in an ongoing
war, whose government justifies the fighting by claims about facts on the ground that the
soldier knows are fabrications. If the government justifies its cause with palpable lies,
known to be lies by soldiers who can see the truth for themselves, and no other just cause
exists, the injustice is manifest to the soldiers. As I argue below, in that case the soldier
should not continue to fight the war.
Yet even those cases are rare. Consider an example. Notoriously, in the wake of
the 1994 Rwandan genocide, France militarily intervened on the wrong side, providing
safe passage for génocidaire forces escaping to eastern Congo. Some French soldiers
explained that their government told them the Hutus were the victims and the Tutsis the
perpetrators of the genocide – the opposite of the truth. With few journalists on the
ground and French media riddled with disinformation, they had no way to know. Being
there on the ground was no help. All the soldiers could see was desperate Hutus fleeing
from the victorious RPF.
We might object that matters have changed decisively since 1994. Today, scores
of videos would be posted on the Internet. The genocidal broadcasts of Radio Television
Milles Collines would be available for all to hear, courageous activists would live-blog
the atrocities, and it would not take diligent investigation to discredit the lies the French
government told its soldiers.
27

Raymond Geuss, Public Goods, Private Goods (Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 45. This is Geuss’s
free translation of a report from Appian, Civil War 2 §35; for Appian’s Greek original and its literal
translation, see p. 125 n. 18.
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Yet even now the case would not be easy. YouTube would also show videos of
the RPF’s military advances into Rwanda, posted by the Hutu Power government as
proof of Tutsi aggression. Skeptics and deniers would claim that the atrocity videos
actually depicted Tutsis killing Hutus, not the other way around, or that the videos
actually came from Burundi; the blogosphere would be filled with spin. Uncertainty
would continue, and – with no reliable JAB court other than an institution that might
seem no more credible or legitimate than the blogosphere – soldiers would remain in
doubt, with the role morality of deference to command decisions as the default.
Some might say that so few wars have been just that on purely statistical grounds
soldiers in a situation of uncertainty should presume the war is unjust.28 If you believe
that, you should certainly not join the military. But presumably soldiers who take moral
issues seriously enough to consider conscientious disobedience don’t believe their
country fights mostly unjust wars; otherwise, why did they enlist? Soldiers may be
mistaken; but to take their dilemma seriously we must assume they think the wars their
country has fought are mostly just. To persuade them otherwise will multiply their
epistemic problems rather than solving them.
In short, we have every reason to believe that Williams’s epistemic claim about
the disability of ordinary soldiers in judging jus ad bellum in the fog of war and politics
remains as true today as in Shakespeare’s time. Regrettably, a JAB court would not
remedy the problem.
Bates’s absolute deference claim
What about Bates’s claim that all this is beside the point, because “obedience to
the King wipes the crime of it out of us”? I labeled this the “absolute deference” claim,
28

I am grateful to Victor Tadros for this suggestion.
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because if there is no moral wrong in obedience, there is nothing to balance the scales
against the soldier’s duty to obey. Indeed, if the King’s authority suffices to wipe out the
crime, there is no point even thinking about jus ad bellum. In Tennyson’s words, “Theirs
not to make reply/ Theirs not to reason why/ Theirs but to do or die.” This is, perhaps, the
most familiar and traditional view of military obedience.
But Tennyson is wrong on two counts. First, because soldiers are reasoning
beings and moral agents, it is always theirs to reason why. No one, no matter how humble
her military rank, is any less a moral agent than the most exalted princes and generals in
the realm. No ignorance is invincible, if soldiers have closed their eyes to injustice. This
is the fundamental insight behind selective conscientious objection on the part of soldiers:
their own moral agency never goes away. If their participation in a war is a crime,
obedience to the King cannot wipe it away. It might if obedience meant the transfer of all
agency to the King, so that Bates and Williams had become nothing but instruments. But
men and women are not mere instruments, and political obligation does not transfer
citizens’ agency to the sovereign.
Some may object that this line of argument badly misses the point. Nearly all
professional soldiers would reject the accusation that by obeying orders without question
they have made themselves mere instruments without conscience. Professional military
organizations pride themselves on their conscience, their unswerving moral compass; and
the willingness of soldiers to sacrifice life or limb for their country is an unmistakable
token of moral devotion – arguably, the most unmistakable token anyone can offer.
Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous Memorial Day address on “the soldier’s faith”
eloquently articulates this point of view:
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I do not know what is true. I do not know the meaning of the universe. But in the
midst of doubt, in the collapse of creeds, there is one thing I do not doubt, that no
man who lives in the same world with most of us can doubt, and that is that the
faith is true and adorable which leads a soldier to throw away his life in obedience
to a blindly accepted duty, in a cause which he little understands, in a plan of
campaign of which he has little notion, under tactics of which he does not see the
use.29
Holmes gets it: Tennyson’s lines are an homage to the Light Brigade’s courage and
devotion, not a paean to institutionalized amorality. Something along these lines is indeed
“the soldier’s faith.” I can’t help but think that it resonates with many of us – even if, as
Holmes surely intended, the resonance is mixed with repulsion.
But I am not convinced. “Theirs but to do or die” sentimentally obscures the fact
that the doing involves not just dying but killing, and failing to notice this is Tennyson’s
second and fatal error. My life may be my own to sacrifice; yours is not. Moshe Halbertal
nicely explains the fallacy involved in thinking otherwise: from the fact that the soldier is
willing to die for the cause, she wrongly infers that the cause has objective value
weightier than a human life – in which case she has moral license to kill for the cause.30
The fallacy lies in reasoning from the strength of commitment, measured by what the
soldier is willing to sacrifice in its name, to objective value. Without this fallacy,
Tennyson’s sentiments are a lot less appealing. “Theirs not to reason why/ Theirs but to
kill on command” is not poet laureate material – and not just because it doesn’t rhyme.
(No rhyme, but also no reason.)
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Now Holmes was not one to confuse strength of commitment for objective value.
He was a thoroughgoing skeptic about objective values. Famously, his outlook was
formed by his own Civil War experiences, when he recognized that his equals in
intelligence and moral seriousness on the Southern side were driven by commitments as
deep as his own abolitionism.31 Holmes doubted any decision procedure could settle the
issue—that’s why the war was fought.32 In our time, Jeremy Waldron has argued that
objective values are beside the point, not because there are none but because we have no
reliable method for settling disagreements about them.33 In Holmes’s eyes, this leaves
commitments you are willing to sacrifice your life for as bedrock, and he did not shrink
from the prospect of killing for one’s commitments, however ungrounded they are in
anything else.
Holmes can be faulted for cranky metaphysics, but this is not the place for that
discussion.34 Fortunately, we don’t need to fish in such deep waters. For even on its own
terms, Holmes’s argument undermines, not supports, the absolute deference claim. If a
soldier recognizes the manifest injustice of her cause – as judged by her own moral
commitments – then she must decline to fight, regardless of the personal sacrifice her
disobedience entails. Otherwise, by Holmes’s own argument, the commitment not to kill
unjustly is not a wholehearted one, regardless of the soldier’s protestations to the
contrary.
Manifest injustice and the no-inquiry claim
31
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Where does that leave us? I’ve argued that soldiers never surrender their power of
moral decision – Bates’s absolute deference claim fails – but that the decision might be
epistemically impossible for an ordinary soldier in the fog of politics and war. Williams’s
epistemic claim is right. Faced with uncertainty and faint prospect of relieving it, what
should the soldier of conscience do?
We can take a clue from the law of jus in bello. Under international law, soldiers
are required to disobey manifestly illegal orders, and this legal principle straightforwardly
has its moral counterpart: you must disobey manifestly immoral orders, such as orders to
shoot prisoners or non-combatant civilians, to torture captives, to condone rape, or to
cover up war crimes. Conversely, military discipline requires soldiers to obey lawful
orders, and international law permits obedience.
In doubtful cases, those that do not “fly the black flag of illegality,” soldiers get
the defense of superior orders unless they know the order is unlawful; and they disobey at
their own risk, meaning that if the order was lawful, their mistaken belief that the order
was unlawful will not protect them from whatever punishment their military code
imposes. Thus, the in bello law of armed conflict incorporates a tripartite scheme of
obligation and permission, depending on whether an order is lawful, manifestly unlawful,
or unlawful but not manifestly so. Lawful orders may be obeyed, and manifestly illegal
orders must be disobeyed. Orders unlawful but not clearly so, and not known to be so,
may also be obeyed (and the soldier disobeys at her own peril).35 The parallel tripartite
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scheme couched in moral terms would distinguish legitimate orders, orders of unclear
moral propriety, and manifestly immoral orders.
The tripartite scheme undoubtedly puts a heavy thumb on the scale in the
direction of obedience: in doubtful cases it strongly favors erring on the side of obedience
– because then the soldier gets the superior orders defense – over erring on the side of
disobedience. Nevertheless, the scheme incontrovertibly recognizes soldiers as moral and
legal agents who are expected to evaluate the rights and wrongs of their actions. In other
words, the tripartite scheme recognizes the inevitability of conscience even in a military
role morality that assigns central importance to obedience and deference.
Suppose we adopt a parallel tripartite scheme for ad bellum judgments. A soldier
ought to fight in just wars; to say otherwise is to embrace pacifism, and pacifists have no
business becoming soldiers.36 But soldiers should refuse to fight in manifestly unjust
wars.
What about doubtful cases? One approach would require soldiers in doubt to err
on the side of non-violence, by refusing to fight unless the war is manifestly just. The
reasoning is simple: if there is even a possibility that you might kill someone in an unjust
cause, don’t put yourself in that position. But such reasoning is faulty, because it assumes
that the moral risk lies exclusively in the decision to use violence. In a just war of selfdefense or a humanitarian intervention, that is not so, because the soldier who errs on the
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side of non-violence risks exposing those she is sworn to defend to mortal danger.
Innocent lives are at stake in either direction.37
Under the tripartite scheme, soldiers should refuse to fight only when the war is
manifestly unjust; in doubtful cases the soldier may defer to her nation’s political
leadership and her superiors in the chain of command. That is the view articulated by
several early modern just war theorists, and I think it is largely right. Consider Suárez’s
1621 De bello: although kings and their advisors are required to make “diligent
examinations” of the justice of war, “common soldiers, as subjects of princes, are in no
wise bound to make diligent investigation, but rather may go to war when summoned to
do so, provided it is not clear to them that the war is unjust.”38 Note that common soldiers
are required to judge whether the war is clearly (constat) unjust – thus, Suárez is no
military amoralist, and he recognizes the inevitability of conscience. But soldiers have no
obligation to delve when the war does not wear injustice on its face. Identical views, in
nearly identical words, can be found a century earlier in treatises by Cajetan and his great
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contemporary Vitoria.39 For all three, then, common soldiers must refuse to fight in an
unjust war, but only if the war is clearly, manifestly, patently unjust (I take it that their
words are synonymous). Soldiers lie under no affirmative duty to investigate unclear
cases.40 And, given a baseline expectation of obedience, if they need not investigate, they
should deploy.
Deference and civilian control of the military
Why believe this? For Cajetan, Suárez, and Vitoria, the reason soldiers should
obey unless their prince’s cause is manifestly unjust derives from broader accounts of
political authority, of debatable relevance in modern democracies. I offer a different
answer: the crucial importance of maintaining civilian control over the military, which
imposes a strong rather than a weak role obligation.
To see this, let’s examine two central concepts of military role morality:
obedience to orders and civilian control of the military. As a first approximation, we may
think of obedience as the requirement of subordinates in the military hierarchy to obey
orders of their military superiors. Civilian control refers to the requirement on all the
military to obey orders from the civilian government.41
Obedience to orders is part of military discipline. It is only one part: the larger
project of discipline is to train the soldier to know what to do even without orders. In
39
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combat, such discipline is a life or death matter.42 So there is a prudential point to
discipline. But there is a moral point as well. Highly disciplined soldiers know when they
must disobey orders because they are illegal – which already shows that discipline is far
from the same thing as absolute deference.
More broadly, military discipline is the most important antidote to war crimes.
The disciplined soldier does not fire wildly out of panic. Discipline restrains soldiers
from taking vengeance on prisoners and from raping and looting when their basest
desires tell them to rape and loot. Disciplined obedience can lay genuine claim to being a
role morality – a set of role expectations that fulfills a compelling moral purpose.43
Disciplined obedience has to do with in bello decision-making. What about the ad
bellum decision of whether to fight at all, our focus here? That decision is equivalent to
the question whether to follow the orders to deploy given by the civilian political
leadership. Here, the key argument for the role morality I have called “the tripartite
scheme” is the crucial importance of maintaining civilian control of the military.
My impression is that theorists of just war have overlooked the moral importance
of civilian control – it is rarely discussed in the philosophical literature on just war.44
Possibly this is because most theorists live in democratic, civilian-led, countries where
military coups and violence against civilians by garrisoned soldiers pose no serious
threat. We lucky residents of advanced democracies take civilian control for granted.
42

For a vivid explanation, see John Keegan, The Face of Battle (Penguin, 1983), p. 20.
What I mean by “disciplined obedience” is obedience to orders as part of a broader military discipline
that teaches soldiers to disobey wrongful orders. It is constrained obedience. I develop a theory of role
morality in Luban, Lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 129-37.
44
There are exceptions. See, e.g., Dan Zupan, “A Presumption of the Moral Equality of Combatants: A
Citizen-Soldier’s Perspective,” in David Rodin and Henry Shue, eds., Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral
and Legal Status of Soldiers (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 224-5; Cheyney C. Ryan, “Moral
Equality, Victimhood, and the Sovereignty-Symmetry Problem,” in Rodin and Shue, pp. 131-52; Cheyney
Ryan, “Democratic Duty and the Moral Dilemmas of Soldiers,” Ethics 122(1) (2011): 10-42; David
Estlund, “On Following Orders in an Unjust War,” Journal of Political Philosophy 15(2): 213:34.
43

25
Doing so is a mistake of monumental proportions. It’s like dismissing the need for
polio vaccination on the ground that polio no longer poses a threat. If polio no longer
poses a threat, that is because of vaccination. If military coups no longer pose a threat, it
is because of institutions of civilian control and ceaseless efforts to make it part of
military culture. As a brief review of history reminds us, stable civilian control is a hardwon and recent achievement of civilization.
The oldest and most universal of all political problems involving militaries is how
to domesticate a society’s warriors – violent, proud men, mostly young, with a yen for
action.45 The world’s oldest work of literature centers on the problem that King
Gilgamesh is at once “violent, splendid, a wild bull of a man, unvanquished leader, hero
in the front lines, beloved by his soldiers ... ,” but also “arrogant, his head raised high,
trampling its citizens like a wild bull.”46 The central theme of the epic is the
domestication of Gilgamesh. In the Hebrew Bible, Samuel warns of similar problems if
the Hebrews insist on appointing a king to lead them in wars.47 Plato discussed the
problem in the Republic, when he asks how the Guardians can be fierce toward their
enemies yet gentle toward their friends. All these are literary texts, but obviously they are
based on real and bitter experiences that their audiences could readily recognize.
In the European Middle Ages, feudal retainers, roaming mercenaries, and
garrisoned armies were a chronic source of murder, rape, and looting. As Blackstone
warned with this history in mind, “In a land of liberty it is extremely dangerous to make a
distinct order of the profession of arms.... The laws therefore and constitution of these
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kingdoms know no such state as that of a perpetual standing soldier, bred up to no other
profession than that of war.”48
Coupled with the violence of soldiers comes the other chronic problem I
mentioned: military coups. The Roman law that Caesar breached by crossing the Rubicon
with his army forbade generals from bringing armed troops into the city; the Romans
rightly foresaw mortal danger to the Republic. After empire replaced the republic, no
fewer than a dozen emperors were deposed through military coups, and those who
weren’t survived by currying favor with the army. The English civil war saw five military
coups and an unsuccessful mutiny within fifteen years. In founding-era constitutional
debates over whether the American republic should have a standing army, the framers
repeatedly warned of the dangers of “a Caesar or a Cromwell” deposing the government
or embroiling it in military adventures. They remembered that during the Revolution, the
Continental Army twice came close to mutiny.49
There are two additional reasons for emphasizing the stringency of civilian
control of the military within the role morality of military officers. Civilian control has
the paradoxical property of vesting ultimate command authority in military amateurs. Of
course, responsible civilian leaders listen carefully to military advice. But nothing
obligates the political leaders to heed it, and contemporary history contains notable
examples of civilian leaders making awful decisions contrary to military advice. Military
leaders are bound to find this structure of authority galling. This is a tension hard-wired
into the very structure of civilian control.
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A second tension lies in an uncomfortable fact that neither military officers nor
civilians in democracies like to speak of openly: many military officers look down on
their civilian society and despise its civilian leaders. The officers have sworn to put
themselves in harm’s way for their country, and subjected themselves to a grueling
discipline; by comparison, their civilian counterparts seem like decadent, morally shallow
hedonists. In some countries, where the officer corps is almost a de facto hereditary caste,
the result has been military coups and military dictatorships. But even in democracies
where military coups are unthinkable, part of the reason they are unthinkable is a
discipline of civilian control of monastic stringency. Officers whose secret instincts tell
them they are morally a cut above their civilian counterparts – including their civilian
leaders – and who sometimes see the civilian leaders making gallingly bad security
decisions must repress those instincts ruthlessly.
The solution to the problem of soldier violence is strict military discipline. And
the solution to the problem of coups lies in placing the military firmly under civilian
control, both in the formal chain of command and – more importantly – in the culture and
training of military officers. Such a military culture must be built around deference to the
chain of command, including above all deference to the political decisions of the civilian
government. As Mark Osiel observes, we want colonels to stop and think, but “we do not
want the generals to start thinking about whether they could do a better job of running the
country.”50 That’s the dilemma the tripartite scheme aims to address. It does so by
insisting that soldiers take heed whether the war they are asked to fight is manifestly
unjust, but obey the order to deploy when the fog of politics and war means that nothing
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is manifest. Bates’s no-inquiry claim is wrong if it denies that manifest injustice matters,
but right that the duty of inquiry stops there.
This is not a return to the unquestioned obedience celebrated by Tennyson and
Holmes – a wholly exclusionary obligation that forecloses conscience and deliberation.
But, between the unrestricted requirement of due diligence on the part of soldiers, and
more limited version of the tripartite scheme, the political arguments grounded in civilian
control of the military strongly favor the latter.

